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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Appellee,

:

v.

:

DONALD WAYNE BROWN,

:

Case No. 900148

Category No. 2

Defendant-Appellant. :
PETITION FOR REHEARING
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON PETITION FOR REHEARING
Two issues are presented in this petition for
rehearing:
1.

In rejecting the State's waiver argument, did the

Court erroneously conclude that defendant did not know his
appointed counsel was a part-time city prosecutor?
2.

Did the Court overlook relevant authority in

addressing defendant's "plain error" argument which he raised for
the first time in his reply brief, and thus improperly reach the
"plain error" question?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Donald Wayne Brown, was charged with second
degree murder, a first degree felony, under Utah Code Ann. § 765-203 (1990), and two counts of aggravated assault, a third
degree felony, under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1990) (R. 2-5).
A jury found defendant guilty of second degree murder
and one count of aggravated assault (R. 423-25).

On appeal, this

Court reversed his convictions and ordered a new trial based on
the erroneous appointment of a part-time city prosecutor to
represent defendant at trial.

State v. Brown, No. 900148 (Utah

Nov. 30, 1992) (a copy of the opinion is attached as Appendix A ) .
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A statement of facts beyond that which appears in the
Statement of the Case is not necessary for this petition.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
First, in reversing defendant's conviction based on the
trial court's erroneous appointment of a part-time city
prosecutor to represent defendant at trial, the Court rejected
the State's argument that defendant had waived the conflict issue
by not presenting it to the trial court.

The Court rejected the

State's waiver argument because the record did not demonstrate
defendant knew of counsel's status as a prosecutor at the time of
trial.

However, the Court then categorically found on the same

record that defendant did not know of counsel's status, and
therefore defendant was not precluded from raising the conflict
issue on appeal.
Because the record does not reveal what defendant did
or did not know about counsel's status, the Court should remand
for an evidentiary hearing on this question, rather than
reversing defendant's conviction outright.
Second, in reviewing defendant's claim that the trial
court erroneously admitted evidence of defendant's prior
aggressive behavior, this Court addressed defendant's plain error
2

argument, which he raised for the first time in his reply brief.
Consideration of the plain error claim under these circumstances
is contrary to precedent and the Court's refusal to consider
defendant's state constitutional argument on the ground that it
was raised for the first time in his reply brief.
The general rule is that the Court will not consider
issues raised for the first time in a reply brief.

The Court

applied this rule when it refused to consider defendant's state
constitutional argument.

However, without explanation, the Court

addressed defendant's plain error argument.
Under settled law, if defendant wished to assert plain
error, he was required to make a plain error argument in his
opening

brief.

His assertion of plain error for the first time

in his reply brief was untimely.

The Court overlooked this

settled law when it considered the plain error issue.
Accordingly, the Court should grant rehearing, modify
the portion of its opinion that addresses plain error to conform
with precedent and the Court's treatment of defendant's state
constitutional claim, and then make clear to future litigants
that it will not consider the issue of plain error unless the
defendant —

in his or her opening

brief —

acknowledges waiver

below and sets forth a plain error analysis.
INTRODUCTION
A petition for rehearing is appropriate when the Court
has overlooked relevant facts or authority, or misapplied the
law.

See Cummins v. Nielson, 42 Utah 157, 172-73, 129 P. 619,

3

624 (1913).

The argument portion of this brief will demonstrate

that the State's petition for rehearing is properly before the
Court and should be granted.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
IN REJECTING THE STATE'S WAIVER ARGUMENT
CONCERNING THE APPOINTMENT OF A PART-TIME
CITY PROSECUTOR TO REPRESENT DEFENDANT AT
TRIAL, THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDED THAT
DEFENDANT DID NOT KNOW OF HIS APPOINTED
ATTORNEY'S STATUS AS A PROSECUTOR
The Court held that the trial court committed
reversible error when it appointed a part-time city prosecutor,
Thomas Willmore, to represent defendant at trial.
op. at 7.

Brown, slip

In doing so, the Court rejected the State's argument

that defendant had waived this conflict challenge to Willmore by
failing to raise it before the trial court:
There is no evidence in the record that Brown
knew of Willmore's status as a city
prosecutor. Although there was some mention
in the record of the jury voir dire that
Willmore had prosecuted a relative of one of
the jurors the year before, there was no
mention that Willmore was currently a city
prosecutor. Because Brown did not know of
Willmore's
status,
he could not have
raised
the issue below.
Consequently, he is not
precluded from raising it here.
Id. at 7 n.2 (emphasis added).
The Court justifiably declined to accept the State's
waiver argument where the record did not clearly establish that
defendant knew of Willmore's status as a city prosecutor at the
time of trial.

However, the Court then categorically found on

the same record that defendant did not know of Willmore's status.

4

Such a conclusion suffers from the same defect the State's waiver
argument did:

the record simply does not reveal what defendant

did or did not know about Willmore's status.

Indeed, Willmore's

affidavit (attached as Appendix B), prepared for this petition,
indicates that defendant did know of counsel's status at the time
of trial.1
Therefore, rather than reversing defendant's conviction
based on the erroneous appointment of a city prosecutor to
represent him, the Court should remand the case to the trial
court for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether defendant
was aware of Willmore's status. Footnote 2 of the Court's
opinion implies that if defendant knew of Willmore's status, the
State's waiver argument has merit.2

Thus, on remand, if the

trial court were to find that defendant knew Willmore was a
prosecutor, the convictions would stand.

If, on the other hand,

the court were to find that defendant did not know of counsel's
status, a new trial would follow.

See State v. Strain, 779 P.2d

221, 227 (Utah 1989) (fashioning similar remand order).

1

The State does not present Willmore's affidavit in an
effort to establish a fact, but simply to demonstrate that there
is an important factual question for the trial court to resolve.
2

The State assumes that the conflict identified by the
Court can be waived. If, however, this is an open question, the
Court should ask the parties for supplemental briefing on the
issue.
5

POINT II
IN ADDRESSING DEFENDANT'S -PLAIN ERRORARGUMENT, RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME IN HIS
REPLY BRIEF, THE COURT OVERLOOKED RELEVANT
AUTHORITY AND IMPROPERLY REACHED THE "PLAIN
ERROR" QUESTION
In his opening brief, defendant argued that the trial
court erroneously admitted evidence of defendant's prior
aggressive behavior in violation of rules 404 and 405, Utah Rules
of Evidence.

Br. of Appellant at 24-26.

The State responded

that defendant had waived the issue by failing to assert a
violation of rules 404 and 405 at trial.
21.

Br. of Appellee at 20-

In making a "straight waiver" argument, the State noted that

M

[d]efendant d[id] not assert that the Court should consider his

argument under the plain error rule."

Ld. at 21 n.10.

Then, in

his reply brief, defendant for the first time argued that the
trial court's admission of the challenged evidence was "plain
error under Rules 404 and 405."

Reply Br. of Appellant at 17.

At oral argument, the State urged the Court not to
consider defendant's "plain error" argument because it had been
raised for the first time in his reply brief.3

The State

explained that it is often very difficult to respond at oral
argument to a claim of plain error raised for the first time in a
reply brief (in such circumstances the State has had no
opportunity to respond in writing).

3

A distinct standard, set

The State also urged the Court not to consider the state
constitutional claim advanced by defendant on a search and
seizure issue for the first time in his reply brief. See Brown,
slip op. at 4 n.l.

6

forth in State v. Eldredqe, 773 P.2d 29, 34-35 (Utah), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 814 (1989), must be applied in the plain error
context, and the analysis of the question can be quite
complicated.
Nevertheless, concluding that "[d]efendant in this case
cannot assert a violation of rules 404 and 405 as a ground for
error on appeal when he made no such assertion at trial, unless
it was plain error," the Court addressed defendant's plain error
claim.

Brown, slip op. at 12. The Court did not mention that

defendant raised the plain error argument for the first time in
his reply brief, apparently overlooking the State's request at
oral argument that it not reach the plain error issue for that
reason.

Although the Court ultimately found no plain error, its

consideration of the question under the circumstances of this
case creates uncertainty as to the validity of Court precedent
and the obligations of the State in briefing a response to an
obviously waived issue where the defendant has not asserted or
analyzed plain error.
This Court has made clear that issues raised for the
first time in a reply brief generally will not be considered.
Von Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162, 1169 n.6 (Utah 1988) (citing
Romrell v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, 611 P.2d 392, 395 (Utah
1980)).

Indeed, without citing either Von Hake or Romrell, the

Court applied this principle in the instant case when it refused
to consider defendant's state constitutional argument because it
was raised for the first time in his reply brief.

7

Brown, slip

op. at 4 n.l.

The Court explained;

If we were to review Brown's state
constitutional analysis under those
circumstances, he would be rewarded for his
omission and given the opportunity to present
an unopposed analysis. The State would be
placed in the difficult position in future
cases of either missing the opportunity to
brief the state constitutional law issue or
having to construct and then rebut the
unbriefed issue.
Ibid.
The same reasoning applies to a plain error argument
made for the first time in a defendant's reply brief in response
to the State's waiver argument.

Accordingly, if defendant wished

to assert plain error, he was required to make a plain error
argument in his opening

brief, with the attendant concession that

a timely objection was not made at trial.

His assertion of plain

error for the first time in his reply brief was untimely.
In sum, the Court should decline to consider
defendant's plain error argument for precisely the same reason it
refused to consider his state constitutional claim.

The analysis

of the evidentiary issue properly ends with the Court's statement
that defendant "cannot assert a violation of rules 404 and 405 as
a ground for error on appeal when he made no such assertion at
trial[.]M

Brown, slip op. at 12. The Court should indicate that

defendant did not assert plain error in his opening brief but
incorrectly reserved the claim for his reply brief as rebuttal to
the State's waiver argument.

Furthermore, the Court should make

clear to future litigants that it will not consider the issue of
plain error unless the defendant —
8

in his or her opening

brief

— acknowledges waiver below and sets forth a plain error
analysis under the Eldredae standard.

This will eliminate the

uncertainty, at least for the State, as to the parties'
obligations concerning the briefing of waiver and plain error.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing argument, the Court should grant
rehearing and modify the portion of its opinion that addresses
plain error to conform with precedent and the Court's treatment
of defendant's state constitutional claim in footnote 1 of the
opinion.

Furthermore, the Court should modify its opinion to

order, instead of outright reversal, a remand for an evidentiary
hearing to determine whether defendant knew of appointed
counsel's status as a prosecutor.

Utah R. App. P. 35(c).

The State certifies that this petition is presented in
±A

good faith and not for delay.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this ^O

day of December, 1992.

R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

JL y&.^Z^foy^^
DAVID B. THOMPSON
(/
Assistant Attorney General
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the foregoing Petition for Rehearing were mailed, postage
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
00O00

-

Stat .e c -f utah#
Plaintiff and Appellee,
F I L E D
November 3"'!'"

v.

Donald Wayne Brown,
Defendant

.

Ill;,l92

Geoffrey J Butler, Clerk

First District, Box Elder County
The Honorable Franklin L, Gunnell
Attorneys:

R. Paul Van Dam, David B. Thompson, Salt Lake
City, for plaintiff
Nathan D. Hult, Loganf for defendant

DURHAM, Justice:
Defendant Donald Wayne Brown and three other men
were charged in the beating death of Miguel Ramirez at the
Western Brine Shrimp harvesting camp. Brown appeals his
convictions of second degree murder, a first degree felony,
under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203, and aggravated assault, a
third degree felony, under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103. We
reverse and remand for a new trial because of defense
counsel's conflict of interest. We also address other
that may be relevant to the new trial.
In October 1989, Brown and eight other employees
were in the Western Brine Shrimp Company's camp on the
northwestern shore of the Great Salt Lake. Brown and three
other men were drinking in one of the four trailers located
at the camp
The four men asked Eddie Apodaca, an employee
who resided in a different trailer, to come over. A brief
scuffle ensued, after which Apodaca returned to his trailer.
The four men followed Apodaca, confronted Miguel Ramirez,
Apodaca's roommate, forced Ramirez outside, and beat him.
Ramirez died several hours later from the injuries he
sustained during the beating.
The next morning, the police arrived, secured the
premises, and conducted two warrantless searches of the
Western Brine Shrimp trailer in which Brown resided. Brown,
Billy Cayer, Ray Cabututan, and William Cummins were charged

with Ramirez's death.
his conviction.

Brown was convicted and now appeals

Among the issues Brown raised on appeal are the
following: (1) whether the trial court properly admitted
evidence seized without a warrant; (2) whether it was
appropriate for a part-time city attorney to represent Brown
as appointed counsel; (3) whether the trial court erred in
admitting evidence of Brown's prior bad acts; (4) whether the
evidence sufficiently supported Brown's conviction of
aggravated assault; (5) whether the prosecutor's reference to
Brown as a "mad dog" in closing argument was unduly
prejudicial; (6) whether the trial court abused its
discretion in giving an Allen-type instruction to the jury;
and (7) whether it was appropriate for the trial court to
assess defense costs to Brown as part of his sentence. Brown
also raised other issues, but because we remand due to
defense counsel's conflict of interest and because they will
not be relevant to the new trial, we do not address them.
WAIVER/PROCEDURAL DEFAULT STANDARD
Defendant raises several of his issues for the first
time on appeal. Despite his failure to preserve these issues
below, he argues that we should reach the merits of his
claims under a "liberty interest" exception noted by this
court in State v. Breckenridqe, 688 P.2d 440, 443 (Utah 1983).
In Breckenridge, the defendant raised a due process
claim for the first time on appeal. The defendant, who
worked at a bodyshop, was charged with arson. During a
"confession," he stated that he had decided to dispose of a
pile of car parts that had accumulated in the corner of the
building by burning them with a paint gun and cutting torch.
The fire spread out of control and damaged the building. Id.
at 442. Without any factual basis indicating that the
defendant intentionally damaged the building, the trial court
accepted his plea of guilty to a charge of arson under Utah
Code Ann. § 76-6-102. On appeal, Breckenridge argued that
his right to due process was violated because the court
accepted his guilty plea "without his understanding the
nature and elements of arson and without a showing that there
was any factual basis upon which to base conviction of a
crime." Breckenridge at 443. We agreed that his right to
due process was substantially affected. Id. at 444.
Rule 103(d) of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides
that we may take notice of "plain error" that affects the
"substantial rights" of a party even though the error was not
brought to the attention of the court. In State v. Eldredge,
773 P.2d 29 (Utah), cert, denied. 493 U.S. 814 (1989), we
described the two requirements for finding "plain error."
First, from our review of the record we must determine that

No. 900148
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it should have beei i obvious to a trial court that it was
committing error. Second, the error must be harmful in that
it affects the substantial rights of the accused. See id. at
35 and cases cited therein. In Breckenridge. this court
commented, "The general rule that constitutional issues not
raised at trial cannot be raised on appeal is excepted to
when a person's liberty is at stake." 688 P.2d at 443. -We
acknowledge that this language, although only an incidental
comment in a case with clear plain error and obvious
constitutional ramifications, has resulted in some confusion
regarding the waiver/procedural default rule. See State v.
Jameson, 800 P.2d 798, 802-03 (Utah 1990); State v. Harrison.
805 P.2d 769, 779 n.13 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 817
P.2d 327 (1991); State v. Hararaves, 806 P.2d 228, 231-32
(Utah Ct. App. 1991). Breckenridge was a case of plain error
in which the Eldredae standard was clearly met. We did not
intend in Breckenridge to carve out an additional exception
to our traditional plain error standard, and we now expressly
disavow any implications to that effect. We therefore review
the issues raised in this case for the first time on appeal
using the pia in error standard.
WARRANTLESS SEARCH
At the hearing on defendant's motion to suppress
evidence, the parties presented the following details
surrounding the search. C)ii October 26, 1989, three officers
of the Box Elder County Sheriff's Department responded to a
reported assault at the Western Brine Shrimp camp. The
officers arrived at the scene and arrested defendant,
Cummins, Cayer, and Cabututan. All four suspects were placed
in trailer 4 (the trailers were numerically designated for
clarity at trial). The officers entered trailer 3, the
trailer in which defendant and the other suspects slept, on
several occasions. First, shortly after their arrival, the
officers did a quick search for safety reasons to locate
additional suspects or weapons. After this search, one
officer propped open the door to trailer 3. Second, the
officers entered at the arrested defendants' request to
retrieve a pack of cigarettes. The officers could not find
the correct brand of cigarettes and entered again when
defendants gave more specific instructions as to the location
of the cigarettes. The officers entered a fourth time to
obtain medication for defendant Cayer. Officer Yeates
testified that on these trips into the trailer, he saw a box,
wet shoes, and a wet wrench.
Approximately two hours after defendants were
transported to the jail, the.officers talked to the owner
property manager of Western Brine Shrimp by radio and
obtained permission to search all of the trailers. Yeates
entered trailer 3 and seized, among other things, a pink bag
containing Brown's wet clothes. Yeates saw Brown's knife on

3

his bunk but did not seize it until the following day. The
question presented is whether the seizure of these articles
was permissible under the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution-1
At the suppression hearing, the trial court ruled
that the search was permissible for the following reasons:
(1) it was incident to an arrest; (2) there were exigent
circumstances, namely, isolation and distance, a homicide,
possible dissipation of blood, access of other employees to
the premises, rain and snow nearby, and a great deal of
agitation and distress on the part of camp personnel; (3) the
items seized were in plain view; and (4) the owner
consented. We review the factual findings underlying the
trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress
evidence using a clearly erroneous standard. We review the
trial court's conclusions of law based on these facts under a
correctness standard. State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781-82
(Utah 1991). The State concedes that the search incident to
arrest and exigent circumstances exceptions are inadequate
and relies only on the consent and plain view exceptions as
justifying the search.
The Fourth Amendment prohibits all unreasonable
searches and seizures. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
1. In his opening brief, Brown stated that seizure of his
clothes and folding knife "should have been suppressed under
either the state or federal constitutions." The State
correctly noted that Brown's analysis of the search and
seizure issue proceeded under Fourth Amendment law with no
effort to analyze the question under article I, section 14 of
the Utah Constitution. The State responded, therefore, by
discussing only federal law. The State cites State v.
Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1247 n.5 (Utah 1988), aff'd, 776 P.2d

631 (Utah 1989), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Lafferty v.
Cook, 949 F.2d 1546 (10th Cir. 1991), where we stated the
general rule that "we will not engage in a state
constitutional analysis unless an argument for different
analyses under the state and federal constitutions is briefed."
In his response brief, Brown obviously realized his
failure to include a state constitutional analysis and
asserted this entirely new argument. If we were to review
Brown's state constitutional analysis under those circumstances, he would be rewarded for his omission and given the
opportunity to present an unopposed analysis. The State would
be placed in the difficult position in future cases of either
missing the opportunity to brief the state constitutional law
issue or having to construct and then rebut the unbriefed
issue. We prefer to review state constitutional law issues
that both parties have had an opportunity to brief. Brown was
aware that a state constitutional law claim might be useful to
him when filing his opening brief. Because he did not analyze
that issue at that time, we will not review it.
No. 900148
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353 (1967). Warrantless searches are per se unreasonable
unless undertaken pursuant to a recognized exception to the
warrant requirement. Id. at 357. Recognized exceptions
include consent searches, Washington v. Chrisman. 455 U.S. 1
(1982) ; searches and seizures incident to lawful arrest based
on probable cause under exigent circumstances, Chimel v.
California. 395 U.S. 752, reh'q denied, 396 U.S. 869 (1969);
searches and seizures made in hot pursuit, Warden v. Havden,
387 U.S. 294 (1967); searches and seizures of contraband in
areas lawfully accessible to the public, State v. Shreve, 667
P.2d 590 (Utah 1983); and seizure of evidence in plain view
after lawful intrusion, State v. Harris, 671 P.2d 175 (Utah
1983).
The core inquiry i i :t a Fourth Amendment analysis is
"whether a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in
the area searched." United States v. Bilanzich, 771 F.2d
292, 296 (7th Cir. 1985). fl[I]t is the right of possession
rather than the right of ownership which ordinarily
determines who may consent to a police search of a particular
place." 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 8.5(b) (2d
ed. 1987). If a third party rather than the defendant
consents to a search, the third party must be one who
possesses "common authority" over the area or has some other
"sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to
be inspected." Id. § 8.5(c) (citing United States v.
Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974)). The State argues that
the owner of the facility had common authority with defendant
and the other residents of the camp over at least the common
areas of trailer 3. The State bears the burden of proving
common authority, and it must do so by a preponderance of the
evidence. Matlock. 415 U.S. at 177, 178 n.14 ("[T]he
controlling burden of proof at suppression hearings should
impose no greater burden than proof by a preponderance of the
evidence.").
Brown shared trailer 3 with two other employees of
the camp. He slept and kept his personal belongings in
trailer 3, Anderson, an employee of the camp, testified that
it was common practice for the men to knock before entering
trailers other than their own. Trailer 3 was used to store
the ground radios and a large refrigerator that held all of
the perishable food for the camp. Anderson testified that
usually the men would knock and Brown or the other co-tenants
of trailer 3 would hand the food out to them. Anderson also
stated that the men rarely entered someone else's trailer if
the employee residing there was away.
The State argues that because Brown's trailer housed
the ground radios and the camp refrigerator, that trailer was
a "common area" over which the owner of the camp had
authority to consent to a search, The trial court agreed
with that analysis. In what amounted ? ~ it- bindings of fact
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and conclusions of law, the trial court rejected the notion
that defendant was a tenant:
I think the testimony is that people came
and went# the[y] shared, they had company
things stored in those areas that they
from time to time cooked for each other*
And I don't think that the owner can give
as much consent as he thinks he can. And
that is# to go to anything that's located
on that premises, I don't share that
view. But I do think he can give consent
to go into the common areas of the
trailers and other things that he owns or
controls there. Everybody else could.
And certainly he could as well. And he
can give consent for others to do that in
my judgment, which I think allows him to
get to that point.
The record adequately supports the conclusion that trailer 3
had a "common area" used by all those working at the camp. In
effect, the employer provided room and board for workers at
the camp. The employer purchased the food for those who lived
in the compound. Trailer 3 had a refrigerator and was the
primary location for the storage of perishable food. Those
who lived at the camp had the right to obtain food located in
trailer 3, even though they lived in other trailers. The door
to trailer 3 was never locked. Furthermore, the ground
radios, which were critical to conducting the work of the
camp, were stored in trailer 3 and accessible to everyone. No
one disputes that every employee was free to enter trailer 3
at any time to obtain food or a radio. The same access was
clearly available to the owner of the property, who gave the
officers permission to search trailer 3.
It is of no consequence that employees who bunked in
other trailers generally knocked when they wished to obtain
food from the refrigerator. The act of knocking hardly
delineates the constitutional limits of the right of privacy.
Knocking prior to entry was merely a courtesy usually extended
by those entering the trailer.
As an owner and operator of the business, Bentzley
had an unrestricted right of access to at least the common
area in trailer 3, and he therefore had the right to grant the
officers authority to enter that area. United States v.
Bilanzich, 771 F.2d 292, 296-97 (7th Cir. 1985); Donovan v.
A.A. Beiro Constr. Co., 746 F.2d 894, 898-900 (D.C. Cir.
1984); State v. Kendrick, 736 P.2d 1079, 1086 (Wash. Ct. App.
1987). Based on that authorization, the officers7 entry into
that area was lawful. From the common area, all the items
seized were in plain sight. None were hidden. None were in
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an area within the trailer in the sole possession of
defendant, such as in a drawer, sleeping bag, container <~»~
footlocker.
It is also significant that Brown and his companion
asked the officers three times to enter the trailer to
retrieve cigarettes and medicine from their private
belongings. Those entries were authorized, and defendant does
not claim otherwise. Nevertheless, even though the officers
had defendant's consent to search only his personal belongings
those three times, whatever expectation of privacy defendant
had in the trailer did not extend to the common area.
Clearly, Bentzley's consent to search extended to the common
area, and the officers who conducted the "plain view" search
were justified in concluding that Bentzley did have authority
under the doctrine set out in Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S.
177 (1990), to consent to the search of the common area, wn
conclude that the trial court did not err in ruling that
Bentzley had authority to consent to the search of trailer _.
DEFENSE COUNSEL'S STATUS \F, PANT--TTMK CITY PROSECUTOR
Brown contends that he was denied due process and the
effective assistance of counsel when the court appointed
Thomas Willmore as his trial counsel.2 Brown claims that
Willmore's employment as a part-time prosecutor for the city
of Tremonton3 while he was representing Brown constituted an
inherent conflict of interest requiring reversal. Although we
do not decide whether it is constitutionally impermissible to
appoint a city attorney with prosecutorial responsibilities to
represent an indigent defendant, we conclude that vital
interests of the criminal justice system are jeopardized when
a city prosecutor is appointed to assist in the defense of an
accused. Consequently, we hold that as a matter of public
policy and pursuant to our inherent supervisory power over the
courts, counsel with concurrent prosecutorial obligations may
not be appointed to defend indigent persons; therefore, we
reverse defendant's conviction and order a new trial. See
State v. Florez, 777 P.2d 452, 458 (Utah 1989) (not!ng our
2
The State argues that Brown waived this objection because
he did not raise it before the trial court. There is no
evidence in the record that Brown knew of Willmore's status as
a city prosecutor. Although there was some mention in the
record of the jury voir dire that Willmore had prosecuted a
relative of one of the jurors the year before, there was no
mention that Willmore was currently a city prosecutor.
Because Brown did not know of Willmore#s status, he could not
have raised the issue below. Consequently, he is not
precluded from raising it here,
3. Brown was tried in Brigham City, Utah. Both Brigham City
and Tremonton are in Box Elder County.
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inherent supervisory power); State v. James, 767 P.2d 549,
557 (Utah 1989) (same); State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 499
(Utah 1988) (Zimmerman, J., concurring in the result) (same);
State in re Clatterbuck, 700 P.2d 1076, 1081 (Utah 1985)
(same).
The Utah criminal code requires that counties,
cities, and towns providing counsel for indigent defendants
ff
[a]ssure undivided loyalty of defense counsel to the
client," Utah Code Ann § 77-32-1(4); see also Glasser v.
United States. 315 U.S. 60, 75-76 (defendant is entitled to
the undivided loyalty of counsel), reh'cr denied sub nom.
Kretske v. United States & Roth v. United States, 315 U.S.
827 (1942).4 This loyalty is compromised when an attorney
4. The Utah Rules of Professional Conduct also address this
issue. An underlying premise of the rules is that a client is
entitled to the undivided loyalty of counsel. Rule 1.7
provides:
(a) A lawyer shall not represent a
client if the representation of that client
will be directly adverse to another client,
unless:
(1) The lawyer reasonably believes the
representation will not adversely
affect the relationship with the other
client; and
(2) Each client consents after
consultation.
. . . .

(c) A lawyer shall not simultaneously
represent the interests of adverse parties
in separate matters, unless:
(1) The lawyer reasonably believes the
representation of each will not be
adversely affected; and
(2) Each client consents after
consultation.
Utah Rules of Professional Conduct 1.7 (1992). The comments
to this rule further state: "[A] lawyer ordinarily may not
act as advocate against a person the lawyer represents in some
other matter, even if it is wholly unrelated."
Because these rules do not govern our decision in this
appeal, we do not undertake an analysis under them.
Nevertheless, we note that the rules establish the general
impropriety of an attorney representing separate clients with
adverse interests. In the instant case, counsel's obligations
to represent both the State and defendant violate this
principle. See Howerton v. State, 640 P.2d 566, 567 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1982) ("A public prosecutor has as his client the
state. It is obvious, therefore, that he cannot appear for
any defendant in cases in which the state is an adverse party
(Continued on page 9.)
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with prosecutorial responsibilities represents an indigent
defendant. This divided loyalty is evident in several facets
of representation. For example, city police officers are
often primary witnesses for the prosecution. If those same
police officers are called to testify in a case a city
attorney is defending, the city attorney may be disinclined
to vigorously and abrasively cross-examine these witnesses
because such conduct might compromise cooperation in future
prosecutions. Counsel may be similarly reluctant to strongly
attack inappropriate police conduct. See People v. Rhodes,
524 P.2d 363, 365 (Cal. 1974). The California Supreme Court
has commented on the difficult situation counsel faces in
such cases:
In the situation confronting a city
attorney acting as a defense counsel there
inevitably will arise a struggle between,
on the one hand, counsel's obligation to
represent his client to the best of his
ability and, on the other hand, a public
prosecutor's natural inclination not to
anger the very individuals whose assistance
he relies upon in carrying out his
prosecutorial responsibilities. Such a
conflict of interest would operate to
deprive a criminal defendant of the
undivided loyalty of defense counsel to
which he is entitled.
Id. at 366; see also Karlin v. State. 177 N.W.2d 318, 321
(Wis. 1970) ("[T]he temptation might well arise not to be too
hard on a police witness who is against your client today but
would be the star witness for your prosecution tomorrow.11).
Similarly, counsel may hesitate to attack the
constitutionality of laws he or she has sworn to uphold as a
(Footnote 4 continued.)
. . . . " ) (citing ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and
Grievances, Formal Op. 142 (1935)).
Additionally, the legislature has recognized the inherent
conflict involved when a prosecutor acts as defense counsel.
Utah Code Ann. § 17-18-1(9)(a) (Supp. 1992) provides:
A county attorney may not:
(a) in any manner consult, advise,
counsel, or defend within this state
any person charged with any crime,
misdemeanor, or breach or any penal
statute or ordinance[.]
Although this statute on its face prohibits only county
prosecutors from acting as defense counsel, it reflects
legislative disapproval of the notion of dual representation
generally.

9

No. 900148

prosecutor- See Howerton, 640 P.2d
loath to take a position as defense
find embarrassing as Commonwealth's
Peyton, 351 F.2d 905, 908 (4th Cir.

at 567. Counsel "may be
counsel which he would
Attorney." Goodson v.
1965).

Furthermore, although counsel almost certainly
intends to diligently represent the defendant's interests, it
is impossible to determine what sort of unconscious
influences may affect such advocacy. See People v.
Pendleton. 367 N.E.2d 196, 200-01 (111. App. Ct. 1977)
("[W]hen matters of judgment and trial tactics are made in
the name of the accused by an attorney with such concurrent
commitments, even the most loyal and resolute defense
attorney might be unable to conclusively establish the
propriety of his actions."), cert, denied. 435 U.S. 956
(1978). Lawyers who simultaneously represent an indigent
defendant and the state are bound to be influenced at some
level by loyalties required of a state's attorney. See id.
Such influences, whether consciously perceived or not,
jeopardize the integrity of the criminal adjudication process.
Finally, a defendant's interests may be compromised
because of a natural hesitation to confide fully in a
prosecutor. The defendant may have information regarding
other crimes that he or she would not want a prosecutor to
know. See Goodsen, 351 F.2d at 909. Defendants should not
feel constrained from discussing openly all aspects of their
cases with counsel. Instead, they should feel fully
protected from any potential abuses of confidence. See
People v. Shinkle. 415 N.E.2d 909 (N.Y. 1980). For these
reasons, it can never be in a defendant's best interests to
be represented by counsel with prosecutorial obligations.
Additionally, dual representation erodes public
confidence in the criminal justice system. To ensure faith
in the impartiality and integrity of the justice system, the
appearance of fairness and impartiality in the adjudication
process must be diligently maintained. An unavoidable
appearance of impropriety is created when a prosecutor
assists in the defense of an accused. The public may
perceive that a prosecutor, desiring to further his or her
own professional career, may use connections and influence to
obtain a favorable result for the defendant. Rhodes, 524
P.2d at 367. Or one may infer that a prosecutor will not
jeopardize a "law and order" reputation by utilizing vigorous
defense tactics.
The public may be further concerned that a
prosecutor's vigorous defense of an accused will result in
decreased support from law enforcement in future cases. A
prosecutor who alienates those law enforcement agencies on
which he or she depends for assistance in the prosecution of
crimes may compromise his or her prosecutorial
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responsibilities. Thus, even if an individual defendant's
interests were not actually jeopardized in a specific case,
the risks to the integrity of the criminal justice system
itself militate against appointing prosecutors to represent
indigent defendants. See id. at 366.
Finally, avoiding criminal defense representation is
ultimately in the best interest of prosecutors. Regardless
of his or her diligence in the representation, the inherent
conflicts of the situation expose counsel to charges that the
representation was not entirely faithful. See People v.
Stoval, 239 N.E.2d 441, 444 (111. 1968).
Thus, it is clear that conflicts of interest inhere
whenever a city prosecutor is appointed to represent an
indigent defendant. Although Chief Justice Hall points out
that Brown was charged with violations of state law, see Utah
Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (second degree murder), Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-5-103 (aggravated assault), and his appointed counsel's
prosecutorial responsibilities were limited to matters of
municipal law, this distinction is immaterial to the
disposition of this case. A city is merely an ancillary unit
of state government. See Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387,
392 (1970) (cities are merely "subordinate governmental
instrumentalities created by the State to assist in the
carrying out of state governmental functionff (citation
omitted)). Both city and state prosecutors deal
interchangeably with all types of law enforcement personnel.
City police officers are often called to testify in
prosecutions of state law. See, e.g.f People v. Washington.
461 N.E.2d 393, 395 (111. 1984) (city police officers were
key witnesses in defendant's trial of state violation).
Furthermore, city prosecutors, as representatives of the
state, share the same loyalties as state prosecutors. In
sum, all of the considerations outlined above apply whenever
a prosecutor is appointed to represent a defendant,
regardless of whether the defendant is charged with a
violation of state or municipal law. Several states have so
held. See, e.g.. Rhodes, 524 P.2d at 365 (city attorney
representing defendant charged with violation of state law
disqualified); Karlin v. State, 177 N.W.2d 318, 321 (Wis.
1970) (noting the "potential for a serious conflict when the
legal representative of one subdivision of a state defends a
person charged with a crime by another subdivision of the
state").
Consequently, we hold that defendant/s right to the
undivided loyalty of counsel was jeopardized. Because a
concrete showing of prejudice would be very difficult to make
when a prosecutor is appointed to assist in the defense of an
accused, we conclude that it is unnecessary and ill-advised
to pursue a case-by-case inquiry to weigh actual prejudice.
Instead, we announce a per se rule of reversal wherever such
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dual representation is undertaken so as to prevent its
recurrence.
PRIOR BAD ACTS EVIDENCE
While conducting cross-examination himself, Brown
asked one of the State's witnesses if he had ever seen Brown
acting in a confrontational manner. The witness responded
that Brown had experienced "a problem with one of the
workers." Brown was then interrupted by his attorney and
discontinued the line of questioning. On redirect, the
prosecutor elicited from the witness that some time prior to
Ramirez's death, Brown was involved in an altercation with
another employee, after which Brown commented, "I'd like to
see [the employee] take a dip in the lake and not come back
up."
At trial, defense counsel objected to the
introduction of this evidence on the ground that it was
beyond the scope of the cross-examination. In his brief on
appeal, defendant asserts that the evidence was improper
under rules 404 and 405 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
Rule 103(a) of the Utah Rules of Evidence requires a
clear and definite objection at trial to preserve an
evidentiary error for appeal. See also State v. Eldredcte,
773 P.2d 29, 34-35 (Utah), cert, denied, 493 U.S. 814
(1989). To preserve a particular evidentiary objection for
appeal, a defendant must specifically state to the trial
court the same grounds for objection presented on appeal.
State v. Van Matre. 777 P.2d 459, 462 (Utah 1989). Defendant
in this case cannot assert a violation of rules 404 and 405
as a ground for error on appeal when he made no such
assertion at trial, unless it was plain error. To be plain
error, however, an error must be both obvious and harmful.
Eldredge, 773 P.2d at 35. In this case, the jury learned of
a prior confrontation with another employee through the
evidence Brown himself elicited. Consequently, we cannot
conclude that admission of the evidence was either obviously
erroneous or harmful.
SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE FOR AGGRAVATED ASSAULT
Defendant claims that the State presented
insufficient evidence to support his conviction of aggravated
assault because the evidence did not establish that he
exhibited "a show of immediate force or violence." Utah Code
Ann. § 76-5-102(1)(b). Because similar evidence will
likely be offered at a new trial, we address this issue.
In reviewing a jury verdict to determine whether it
was based on sufficient evidence, we view the evidence
presented and all inferences to be drawn therefrom in a light
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most favorable to the verdict. State v. Gardner, 789 P.2d
273, 285 (Utah 1989), cert, denied. 494 U.S. 1090 (1990).
The jury, not the appellate court, should weigh the evidence
and assess witness credibility. State v. Booker, 709 P.2d
342, 345 (Utah 1985). Thus, we will sustain the jury's
verdict where there is any evidence or reasonable inferences
that can be drawn from the evidence from which the jury could
make findings of all the elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt. Id.
Brown was charged with aggravated assault under Utah
Code Ann. § 76-5-103. Violating this section involves
committing an assault, defined in Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102
as "a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force or
violence, to do bodily injury to another." (Emphasis
added.) Richard Anderson, the victim of defendant's
aggravated assault, testified that wrier* he stepped from his
trailer to see what was happening, the ieur men were beating
the victim a short distance away. Defendant raised a
crescent wrench in his hand, pulled it back, and said to
Anderson, "Do you want some of it too?"
Brown argues that immediacy requires close proximity
and that he and Anderson were not close enough to make the
act of raising the wrench a show of immediate force or
violence* We tend to agree that proximity has some relevance
in determining the immediacy of the threat. In this case,
Anderson was walking out of a trailer in a remote fishing
camp on the Great Salt Lake. Outside of his trailer, he
observed four men beating a fellow employee. In this
context, Brown raised a wrench and threatened Anderson.
Although the transcript is unclear regarding the exact
distance between Brown and Anderson, we are persuaded that in
light of the surrounding circumstances, the jury could have
found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Brown's threat was
accompanied by a "show of immediate force or violence, to do
bodily injury to another." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102(1)(b).
PROSECUTOR'S REFERENCE TO DEFENDANT AS "MAD DOG"
In his closing argument to the jury, the prosecutor,
referring to Brown and the three other defendants, stated,
"There isn't one of us here who knows how we would react in a
situation like that with four mad dogs out there beating on
someone." Defendant objected to this statement shortly after
it was made. He argues that the prosecutor's comment
mandates reversal of his convictions.
As we have frequently noted, "Counsel for both sides
have 'considerably more freedom in closing argument' and 'a
right to discuss fully from their standpoints the evidence
and the inferences and deductions arising therefrom.'" state
v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 1284 (Utah 1989) (quoting State v.
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Laffertv, 749 P.2d 1239, 1255 (Utah 1988) (quoting State v.
Valdez. 513 P.2d 422, 426 (Utah 1973)))• Prosecutors engage
in misconduct, however, when they assert personal knowledge
of the facts in issue or express personal opinion in the form
of unsworn testimony that tends to "exploit the influence of
the prosecutor's office and undermine the objective
detachment that should separate a lawyer from the cause being
argued." Parsons, 781 P.2d at 1284 (citing Laffertv, 749
P.2d at 1255; ABA Standards for Criminal Justice § 3-5.8
(2d ed. 1980)).
Referring to a defendant as a "mad dog" is the type
of personal invective that reflects a lack of objective
detachment a prosecutor should maintain in carrying out
prosecutorial responsibilities. It should not be part of the
prosecutor's rhetoric on remand. However, because we reverse
for other reasons, we do not decide if the comment was
sufficiently egregious to warrant reversal.
ALLEN-TYPE CHARGE TO JURY
Although defendant did not object to the instruction
at trial, he argues on appeal that the trial court
erroneously gave an Allen-type instruction to the jury before
it began its deliberations. Instructing the jury, the court
stated:
The Court instructs the Jury that although
the verdict to which each Juror agrees
must, of course, be each Juror[']s own
conclusion, and not a mere acquiescence in
the conclusion of fellow Jurors yet, in
order to bring eight minds to a unanimous
result the Jurors should examine with
candor the questions submitted to them,
with due regard and deference to the
opinions of each other. A dissenting Juror
should consider whether their [sic] state
of mind is a reasonable one, when it makes
no impression on the minds of so many
Jurors equally honest, equally intelligent,
who have heard the same evidence, with an
equal desire to arrive at the truth, under
the sanction of the same oath. You are not
to give up a conscientious conclusion after
you have reached such a conclusion finally,
but it is your duty to confer with your
fellow Jurors carefully and earnestly, and
with a desire to do absolute justice both
to the State and to the Defendant.
An Allen charge takes its name from Allen v. United
States. 164 U.S. 492 (1896). In Allen, the United States
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Supreme Court approved a supplemental instruction given to a
jury that was having difficulty arriving at a unanimous
verdict. Id. at 501. This type of instruction has since
been criticized as tending to pressure jurors into giving up
their sincere convictions merely because a majority reached a
different conclusion. See State v. Medina, 738 P.2d 1021,
1022 n.l (Utah 1987). We acknowledge that a supplemental
instruction has the potential to be coercive, depending on
its content, if given to jurors who have reached an impasse.
In this case, however, the charge was given prior to jury
deliberations and the instruction specifically directed the
jurors not to give up their own "conscientious conclusions."
In this context, the inherent danger of coercion resulting
from the instruction is dissipated, if not lost. See State
v. Wilson, 627 P.2d 1185, 1187 (Kan. Ct. App.), aff'd and
remanded, 634 P.2d 1078 (Kan. 1981). We reject Brown's
assertion that this instruction "deprive[d] the Defendant of
the benefit of the convictions of each individual juror."
The trial court did not err in allowing this instruction.
REIMBURSEMENT OF DEFENSE COSTS
Finally, defendant argues that it was improper for
the trial court, as part of his sentence, to order him to
reimburse the county for the costs of his defense. We will
not set aside a sentence imposed by a trial court unless the
sentence represents an abuse of discretion, the trial court
failed to consider all relevant factors, or the sentence
imposed exceeded the limits prescribed by law. State v.
Gibbons, 779 P.2d 1133, 1135 (Utah 1989). Utah Code Ann.
§ 77-32a-l allows the trial court to "require a convicted
defendant to make restitution and pay costs." Section
77-32a-3, however, states that before including in the
judgment a sentence that a defendant pay costs, the court
must determine whether the defendant will be able to pay
them. In this case, the court apparently failed to consider
defendant's financial status before assessing defense costs.
Accordingly, if this issue recurs on remand, we instruct the
trial judge to consider and make findings regarding
defendant's ability to pay any costs levied.
The conviction is reversed, and this matter is
remanded to the district court for a new trial.

WE CONCUR:

Richard C. Howe, Associate
Chief Justice

Michael D. Zimmerman, Justice

15

No. 900148

STEWART, Justice:

(Concurring)

I concur in the majority opinion. I write only
because I believe the majority ought not approve the jury
instruction that it characterizes as an Allen charge. In my
view, the instruction given provides too much leverage to a
majority of jurors to exert undue pressure on the minority.
This has the potential effect of distorting the deliberative
process whereby jurors, through the free exchange of their
individual views, reach a consensus through discussion,
reason, and argument. Jury instructions should promote the
deliberative process by encouraging the discussion of
evidence and instructions. That process should not be
sacrificed in the interest of reaching a quick group decision.
I recognize that the instruction states that a juror
is not to give up a "conscientious conclusion" after reaching
such a conclusion. However, the instruction given at the
beginning of deliberations weighs too heavily in favor of
telling a juror to yield his or her conviction to the
majority early on. In short, the instruction reinforces the
opinion of the majority more than is appropriate, at least in
the beginning of deliberations.
Perhaps it is justifiable to give a true Allen
charge after a lengthy trial in which the jury, after full
discussion of the evidence over a protracted period, is
unable to agree. My fear is that this instruction may have
the effect of causing jurors who are initially in a minority
to yield their convictions before there is a full airing of
the evidence and of each juror's views.
I do not believe, however, that on the facts of this
case, the instruction was prejudicial error.

HALL, Chief Justice:

(Dissenting)

I do not join the court in reversing the conviction
on the ground of conflict of interest in the absence of a
showing that defendant was in any way prejudiced by reason of
his representation by a part-time city attorney. Nothing in
the record reveals that defendant was afforded anything less
than the undivided loyalty and able assistance of counsel he
was entitled to,1 and it is not for us to speculate
otherwise.
In addition, the prosecutorial duties of defense
counsel were limited to violation of city ordinances,2
1. Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-1(4).
2. Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-928 (amended in 1991 to permit
prosecution of class A misdemeanors in the name of the State
of Utah).

whereas defendant was tried for a violation of state law.
Hence, there was no conflict with defense counsel's duties as
a city attorney.
The distinct differences in the prosecutorial
responsibilities of county and city attorneys explain the
reason the statutory prohibition against county attorneys
acting as defense counsel3 does not include city attorneys.
In any event, in view of the evidence adduced at
trial, it is unlikely that a new trial will produce a
different result.

3. Utah Code Ann. § 17-18-1(9)(a) (Supp. 1992) (formerly Utah
Code Ann. § 17-18-2(10)(a)).
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